University of Miami Law Review
Volume 31
Number 4 1976 Developments in Florida Law

Article 14

9-1-1977

Penal Reform
The Honorable David U. Strawn

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
The Honorable David U. Strawn, Penal Reform, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 1159 (1977)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol31/iss4/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

PENAL REFORM
THE HONORABLE DAVID U. STRAWN*

This article examines aspects of penal reform within our
present criminal justice system. The author advocates application of a systems analysis approach to penal problems in order
to provide predictive knowledge concerning effects that arise
when changes or reforms are made within the penal system. He
also suggests certain practical improvements that can be made
in the present system and proposes that an agency be established
by the Florida legislature to study the criminaljustice system.

Those who address the subject of penal reform are frustrated,
on the one hand, by the varieties of recommended reform and, on
the other, by the apparent complacency of the corrections bureaucracy. It seems that while critics of the present criminal justice system vigorously advocate or condemn rehabilitation, deterrence,
punishment or banishment, there occur few changes within the system, and problems continue to grow. This article proposes that a
systems analysis approach be adopted for the study of the criminal
justice apparatus. By using such an approach to examine prison
populations, how they are selected, and related social goals, debate
and action on penal reform can become better focused, and therefore more effective.
Most reformers make an assumption that prison populations
are homogenous. Yet it appears to even a casual observer that an
unemployed fifty year old burglar with three convictions will respond differently to his penal experience than a man who murdered
his wife's lover. Treatment of one will undoubtedly fail when applied to the other. Likewise, the concept of special treatment for
first offenders runs afoul of the fact that most murderers are first
offenders. To make the situation more difficult, prevailing social
attitudes toward the potential for rehabilitation of criminals cannot
be empirically verified. Does rehabilitation work? Florida provides
no proof. Only recently the legislature required corrections officials
to accumulate data on recidivism in order to measure effectiveness
of penal programs in preventing repeated offenses.
A profile of the prison population is clearly a first step in evalu* Circuit Judge, Titusville, Florida.
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ating proposals for reform. Understanding who is likely to become
an inmate is essential to predicting what treatment will be appropriate. If the effectiveness of rehabilitation, deterrence or banishment
is measured with respect to those actually in prison, decisions on
who ought to go to prison can be made more intelligently.
Realistic perception of the issues in penal reform is almost impossible without recognizing the divided decisionmaking regarding
who enters Florida's inmate population. Consider the steps: (1) the
legislature defines a "crime"; (2) the crime may or may not be
committed; (3) the victim may or may not complain; (4) the police
may or may not arrest; (5) the prosecutor may or may not charge;
(6) the defendant may plead, not plead, or plea-bargain; (7) the jury
or judge may convict or acquit; (8) the judge may incarcerate or not;
and (9) the Parole and Probation Commission decides how long the
inmate remains incarcerated. It is apparent that the "upstream"
decisions of legislators, victims, police, lawyers, and judges cannot
be isolated from "penal" decisions; all of the prior steps must be
considered in an analysis of the later ones.
Plea-bargaining illustrates how a decision at one stage can affect results in others. If plea-bargaining were abolished or severely
restricted, prosecutors would modify their practices. In effect, they
would quite likely do their bargaining before the decision to prosecute, and fewer prosecutions would be filed, most likely only those
perceived as highly proveable. The conviction rate would probably
increase, and judges would feel more confident about their sentences, possibly imposing longer terms. Thus, abolition of pleabargaining could shift prison populations even more away from the
"rehabilitable," and would require extensive facilities for holding
ever more difficult prisoners for longer terms.
But penal decisions are being made by "downstream" officials
who lack special training and are not as responsive to the electorate
as those in the earlier decisionmaking stages. At present, the problem of reducing sentence disparity is in the hands of judges, who are
thus forced to make decisions more appropriate for the people's
representatives in the legislature. Florida's judges are not necessarily representative of their communities, are largely inaccessible to
the voters, and do not provide an open forum for determining sentencing policies. There is nothing in their training to qualify judges
for the particular sentencing decisions they make; and what they
learn by experience does not readily disseminate to their peers or to
the legislature. Yet as long as the legislature is inactive, trial judges
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must continue to make the sentencing decisions which determine
who enters the prison population. This fact will continue to affect
the success of prison programs as well as the effectiveness of deterrence based on an equal application of justice.
Merely to state the possible social policies that are affected or
accomplished by a penal program is to make evident that there
must be agreement in priorities before there can be consistency at
any practical level. Illustrative objectives of penal reform are: (1)
reduced expense; (2) preservation of constitutional rights; (3) improved public safety and security; (4) avoidance of the hardening
of criminal attitudes by incarceration; (5) rehabilitation of those
most likely to benefit; (6) effective deterrence where possible, and
so forth. At present, some of these objectives are being pursued at
cross-purposes. For example, the purpose of rehabilitation is being
thwarted by the policy of banishment implict in choices by judges
and juries to imprison those most feared by the community. Such
persons in effect have never been "habilitated" and thus are the
worst prospects for any form of rehabilitation. The failure of acrossthe-board rehabilitation under these circumstances is not surprising, but conclusions concerning the probability of success of rehabilitation should not be drawn until these conflicting purposes have
been eliminated or reconciled.
The multiplicity of participants, procedures and objectives involved in the penal process make it imperative that a comprehensive means be found to analyze the entire apparatus and to provide
data on the significance of each factor within the apparatus. Such
a means presently exists. The social sciences are developing deductive mathematical computer models of institutional systems which
can be used to understand relationships within a governmental apparatus and to anticipate the effect of a change in one area on an
entire system.' Such models, if applied to penal reform, ' could be
used to predict the most likely outcomes of proposed changes to our
methods of addressing crime. For instance, a prediction might be
made on the effect of changing the plea bargaining process in order
1. See M.

GREENBERGER, MODELS IN THE POLICY PROCESS (1966); J. HILL & A. KERBER,

MODELS, METHODS, AND ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES IN EDUCATION RESEARCH

(1967); A.

KAPLAN,

THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY (1964).

2. S. NAGEL, MODELING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (In press 1977). See generally
Nagel, A Conceptual Scheme of the Judicial Process, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Dec., 1963,
at 7-8.
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to achieve the best balance of desirable effects socially and
economically. Similarly, a computer model, continually updated by
new data, could be employed to study the effects of changes in
mandatory sentencing.
There is only one arm of government with the capacity to develop such a system. The judiciary lacks the power to appropriate
the money, the executive branch is similarly constrained, and there
are political limitations on the creation of another bureaucracy.
Since the power is in the legislature to make the necessary laws for
penal reform the legislature-is the logical body to control the means
available to monitor and examine in detail both the present corrections systems and any future systems.
Toward this end, it is proposed that the legislature create an
agency, responsible to a legislative committee, with the following
objectives: (1) to centralize and control data gathering concerning
the criminal justice system; (2) to establish goals for the criminal
justice system; (3) to study existing resources which are adaptable
to these goals; (4) to initiate projects to provide the behavioral analysis necessary to formulate new programs; (5) to create computer
models to aid in predicting the effectiveness of legislation; and (6)
to monitor the criminal justice system continuously and recommend
adjustments. This last purpose reflects an awareness that there is
no single static solution to any social problem. As society changes,
so must its institutions; we should become accustomed to the lack
of finality and the need continually to adapt.
Having in mind the dynamic nature of the penal process, the
Corrections Committee of the Florida Bar has approved in principle
a number of the following proposals, which are offered as examples
of the kind of thinking adaptable to a total systems analysis.
We must consider the effects of disseminating information
about lawbreaking and the effects of idealization of lawbreaking on
both the young, in terms of their altered moral values, and on the
adult population, in terms of their more realistic attitude toward
law enforcement. Public attitudes are ultimately reflected in the
decisions of jurors, to whom a prosecutor should be able to present
meaningfully the significance of the crime allegedly committed.
Crime victims need to be encouraged to report and prosecute
crimes; a strong incentive would be some form of compensation for
victims.
Procedures at the pretrial stage ought to be adapted to facilitate rapid decisions on charging and bonding. Equipped with relia-
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ble predictive information from behavioral analysis, officials would
be able to estimate bonding requirements and the likelihood of persons coming to trial without committing another crime. Public
awareness of valid information about the costs and necessity for
imprisonment until trial could remove public pressure from judges
who would then be able more easily to determine the appropriateness of pre-trial release.
In order to restore integrity to the criminal justice system, plea
and sentence bargaining should be studied with the object of eliminating both. "Negotiable" justice encourages disrespect; it permits
the offender to determine the course of his crime and then the course
of the social response. If the prosecutor decides to charge, he should
be required to try the case unless a conviction is impossible or the
defendant pleads quilty as charged. On the other hand, discretion
to grant probation in lieu of filing charges should be given to prosecutors to relieve the pressures created by diminished plea bargaining. Such a system could avoid the present anomalous and burdensome routine of holding hearings on perfunctory pleas of guilty, with
adjudication being withheld in order to grant probation.
Mandatory minimum sentencing laws should be enacted. To
frame such laws requires voluminous accurate, detailed information
on the frequency of commission of classes of crimes, the relative
criteria of wrongdoing involved (e.g., use of a firearm), and the
effectiveness of alternative penal dispositions. Information of this
type might be manageable only by means of computer models; indeed only such hard data should be acceptable in debating sentencing reform. Feedback from continuous data gathering would be essential to evaluation of legislative decisions and revisions. Judges
alone are not equipped to make such decisions, and they should be
relieved of the sole responsibility for making them.
A primary effect of mandatory sentencing would be a more
predictable inmate population. Rehabilitation could be focused on
persons for whom data showed it would be effective, and abandoned
or made elective elsewhere. Banishment as an alternative would
also have its place, for those who did not wish rehabilitation or for
those whom it would not help, as determined by realistic information. Another effect of mandatory sentencing would be the modification of the Parole and Probation Commission's presently unappealable power to amend sentencing decisions. Prosecutors, judges and
inmates would have the assurance presently lacking that conviction
will always result in certain punishment. It seems unlikely that any
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system can deter crime unless the prospect of detection, prosecution
and imprisonment is highly predictable.
The larger purpose of a legislative agency for ongoing penal
reform would be to enlarge the awareness of the citizen, lawyer and
judge concerning the techniques and policies of law enforcement at
all levels because each level is connected to all others. No one
agency of the executive or judicial branches should be given the
responsibility for the success or failure of the entire apparatus. Only
the representative arm of our government can aid every involved
agency in meaningful ways.
The cause of our current apparatus breakdown appears to be a
low degree of social effort toward inculcating guilt feelings over the
commission of wrongful acts, the lack of concern with the victims
of crimes and the consequences to them of reporting crimes, the
existence of plea bargaining between lawyers and sentencebargaining with judges, disparity in sentences from judge to judge
for what is ostensibly the same offense, and disparity and inconsistency in correctional treatment of sentenced persons. By analyzing
the system as a whole and by the use of computer systems analysis
models with reliable data, we may be able to assess the effects of
reform in advance, suggest meaningful changes and reduce the difficulty and waste of our present trial and error methods.

